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PLATO AS A THEIST.
INTRODUCTION
A* Subject of Thesis Defined.
The subject of this thesis is Plato as a Theist.
By the term theist we meaa one who believes in a deity
existing in the universe, but distinct from the universe
and transcending it.
B. Purpose of Thesis.
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the
character of Plato's belief regarding deity. Did he
believe in the gods of his contemporaries, or in any
god at all? What did he mean when he employed the term
God ? Did he believe in one God, or in many gods? What
place did the idea of God have in his philosophy? In
what kind of a God did Plato believe, and what was his
character? These questions, and others of a kindred
nature, will be discussed in the body of this thesis.
C« Previous Works on the Theism of Plato.
To the best knowledge of the writ*r, with the
exception of a few foreign works, this problem has never
been treated directly and exclusively by any author.
A large number of books have been written which deal
with the religious beliefs of the Greeks. In all of
these, Plato is mentioned; and in some, such as Adam's
Religious Teachers of Greece . a very clear and pertinent
discussion of certain aspects of this problem may be

found. None, however, are devoted exclusively to the
treatment of Plato's belief regarding God, except for
two. One is a small volume by J. G. A. Oelrichs,
entitled Commentatlo de doctrlna Platonls de Deo a
Chrlstlanls et Recentlorlbus Platfrnlcls variie Expi i cat
a
et Corrupt
a
.
published at Marburg, Germany, in 1788»
As the title indicates, the book is written in Latin,
which renders it inaccessible to the general public;
and its age precludes the possibility of the inclusion
of any recent material on Plato. Furthermore, it
contains little original comment on the problem. The
second is a thesis presented at the University of Geneva
for a doctor's degree toy M. Bovet, entitled Le Dieu
de Platon
.
d'apres 1 ' ordre chronologlque des dialogues ,
and published in Paris in 1902. Unfortunately it was
not available for use in the composition of this thesis.
It seems to be little known in this side of the Atlantic
A thljd work by Tayler Lewis, on Plato Against the
Atheists contains much valuable matetial. It is, aowever
chiefly a commentary on the Laws, and does not give a
synoptic view of Plato's teaching. Besides, it is out
of date, and little known. Apparently there is still
room for investigation of this question.
D. Sources of the Thesis.
1. Primary Sources.
This thesis is mainly based upon such information
as can be gleaned from the writings of Plato himself,
which contain practically all that is known of his
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philosophy. These writings exist in two divisions, the
Dialogues, and the Epistles.
a. The Dialogues.
Of the two divisions, the Dialogues are the more
important, The meat of Plato's philosophical system is
contained in thenu The text wnich I have employed is
1
mainly the English translation of Professor Jowett.
Wherever the Greek text is employed for quotation, it is
2
that of Teubner.
b« The Epistles .
The Epistles are more autobiographical than
philosophical; and have little to contribute to the
discussion. Whenever they are used, the text is that
of Post. They cast some light on the life and private
thought of Plato, since they are less formal in their
treatment of questions than are the Dialogues .
2. Evaluation of Primary Sources.
These sources are not employed without discrimination
as to their genuineness, order, and character. To be sure,
it is a truism to state that when the writings of a
prolific genius come to us without date, copyright,
and authorized text, much preliminary work is necessary
before they can be used as a basis for constructing
the systematic thought of their author. It is not within
the scope of this thesis to make a thorough original
investigation of these fundamental matters. So much
•
4excellent work has already been done that such, a labor
would be gratuitous. The work of competent scholars as
here cited will be deemed sufficient for the preliminary
considerations.
a. Genuineness*
The following is a classification of Plato's
Dialogues in accordance with Zeller's treatment of
the subject.
I. Unquestionably Genuine.
Protagoras, Phaedrus , Symposium . Gorglas »
Theaetetus
. Re public . Phaedo, and Timaeus.
II. Genuine in Spite of Questioning.
Philebus
.
Sophist . Polltlcus . Parmenldes .
Cratylus .
III. Almost Certainly Genuine.
Crltlas
.
Meno, Euthydemus
.
Apology
.
Crlto*
IV. Youthful Productions.
Lysis . Charmides . Laches , Lesser Hlppias
.
Euthyphro .
V. Probably Spurious.
Menexenus . Ion .
VI. Very Probably Spurious.
Greater Hlppias . I Alclbiades .
VII. Pronounced Spurious.
II Alclbiades . Theages, Anterastl, Hlpparchus .
Minos
.
Clltopho , Epinomis .
Zeller believed that the Laws are probably a genuine
composition of Plato's old age, published after his
5
death by Philippus of Opus.
Lutoslawskl, in commenting on the opinion of
6
Schlelermacher, agrees in main with this classification.
All those listed under Class VII, plus Hlppias Major ,
he rejects, saying that they have since been
generally recognized as spurious, or as written by some
•
5.
pupil of Plato. Those In Classes V and VI, apart from
Hlpplas Ma.1or . he regards as possibly genuine, but "of
no importance for the study of Plato's philosophy." He
rejects also the Lysis in company with the others in
7
Classes VI and VII, but his opinion does not seem to
be supported by the other authorities. For this reason
it does not appear in his chronology.
8
Lewis Campbell concurs in this general judgment,
and says that the Dialogues mentioned in Class VII are
"generally condemned." The Hippias Major and the Clltopho
he calls "plausible," and the Hlpplas Minor , .1 Alciblades ,
and the Menexenus he calls "Platonic, but not Plato's."
Windelband differs from this scheme somewhat by a
provisional acceptance of the Hlpplas Minor and X
9
Alclblades
,
though he says that they ".... did not
originate with Plato, but with men of his scnool, who were
closely related with the Eleatic dialectic and eristic."
He rejects the Sophist , the Polltlcus. and the Parmenide s.
Windelband' s verdict is far from general. No other
writer defends his position; ^nd, on the whole, It
seems safe to say that those Dialogues which Zeller
places in Classes VI and VII are unworthy of serious
consideration, while the rest may be accepted with more
or less confidence.
10
As regards the rejected Dialogues . Taylor says:
"As to the now generally rejected dialogues,
it m^y be observed th&t they are all brief, and
of no great moment. Our conception of Plato as
a thinker and writer is not seriously affected
by the rejection of any of them."
#i
6.
Certainly this is true as far as the problem of theism
is concerned.
As regards the Epistles , it seems probable that all,
with the exception of the first, are genuine. Professor
11
Taylor contends that the attack on the Epistles has
little ground when we consider that Plato* s style could
not be successfully imitate^ half a century after his
death, whereas the Epistles are Platonic in style.
12
Hackforth holds that five of the letters, Nos. 3»4,7,8,
13, are getoulne; that five are spurious; and that Nos.
9, 10, 11 are doubtful. Poet, whose text is used as a basis
of study, rejects only Epistles 1, 5» 9, 12. The present
tendency is toward a more general acceptance of the
Epistles as genuine, though Heidel rejects all.
b. Chronology.
After eliminating from consideration those Dialogues
which are either spurious or seriously doubtful, it is
necessary to arragge the rest in some sort of order, that
the logical progression of Platonic thought may be evident.
There are always two dangers in attempting a chronological
arrangement of undated works: first, that a traditional
chronology with no real authority will be accepted; and
secondly, that the attempt to establish chronological
order by internal evidence will either be subjective, and
hence of no weight beyond mere personal opinion, or else
that it sill be based on the development of content,
which destroys the value of the result for historical
purposes. It is illogical to argue that a number of
essays must have been written in a certain order

7because of the expansion and development of their content,
and then to argue development of thought from the
chronology which has been deduced. However, it is true
that if a clea* and definite line of thought gives a
clue to the chronology of the dialogues, incidental
references to some subject other than the one employed as
a criterion of sequence may be grouped in accordance
with the established chronology to demonstrate another
development of thought. One line of thought may thus
depend on anbther.
Precisely this method is followed in this thesis,
though the main method of procedure is not chronological.
The chronological arrangement of the Dialogues is based
on their stylistic peculiarities; and on this the
argument for development of Plato's theistic thought is
founded. Since the latter is not employed ^s a standard
of chronological sequence, it is fair to deduce its
development in this way.
Of the several chronologies which have been propounded,
that of Lutoslawski appears to be the most satisfactory.
14
He states in his Preface that there is ".... need of a
new method in order to attain a greater certainty as to
the order in which Plato wrote his dialogues." The scheme
of procedure is based on the science of Stylometry, as
applied to "..» five hundred peculiarities of Plato's
style (observed in fifty-eight thousand cases) collected
in the course of fifty years by some twenty authors
working independently." This is as n«ar an approach to
»#
8.
objectivity as it is possible to make. Furthermore, where
the author has relied upon development of content to
guide him, his criterion has been the development of
Plato's Logic, not his Theism, so that there is no danger
of the "vicious circle."
The order ot the Platonic Dialogues propounded by
16
Lutoslawskl is as follows:
A. Small Dialogues. (Socratic.)
t . Euthyphro ,
2. Apology
3. Crlto
4 . Charmides
5. Laches
6. Protagoras
7. Meno
8. Euthydemus
9. Gorglas
B. First (Logical) Group.
1 . Cratylus
2. Symposium
3. Phaedo
C. Middle (Logical) Group.
\ . Republic I-X
2. Phaedrue
3. Theaetetus
4. Parmenldes
D. Latest (Logical) Group.
t . Sophist
2. Polltlcus
3. Philebus
4. Timaeus
5. Crltlaa
6. Laws
The Lysi s, which Lutoslawstl rejects as un-Platonic, may
be considered as belonging to the first group.
In contrast to Lutoslawskl 1 s stylistic-chronological
method, which seems to be the best of similar attempts,
#
9.
17
Mackay offers a fresh and novel hypothesis. He suggests
that the divisions of the Dialogues may represent not
"
.... stages in Plato's thought as it developed out of
the early Socratlc teaching, but the stages through
which a young dialectician must pass in order to become a
18
Platonlst." He divides the Dialogues as follows:
I. Laches, Lysis , Charmldes . Euthyphro , Apology , Crito,
Gorglas . Me no . Euthydemus , Craty lua
.
II. Protagoras . Symposium . Phaedo , Republic . Phaedrus .
III. Theaetetus
.
Parmenides
.
Sophis t, Statesman
.
Philebus, TimaeuB , Crltlas . Laws
.
He thinks that the first group were spoken "....to a large
group with a popular interest in the Socratic way of life; 1 '
the second, "...to a smaller group of young men who from
time to time took up this way of life in the Academy;"
the third, "...to an inner circle of students."
A comparison of the two lists lahows that there is no
great alteration of the order of the Dialogues from
Lutoslawski ' s scheme. The Socratlc Dialogues are arranged
differently, but they are still classed as earlier, and
from the Symposium on, the arrangement is identical in
sequence with that of Lutoslawski.
The arrangement of Lewis Campbell in the Encyclopaedia
19
Britannlca is topical rather than chronological, and has,
therefore, no bearing on this question. The chronology of
Lutoslawski, therefore, is the most practical for our
present purposes.
c. Classification^
The classification of Plato's Dialogues may be
#
10.
attempted from any one of several standpoints
,
according
to the topic under discussion or according to the
predilections of the writer. In the preceding chronological
arrangement the headings give a classification based upon
logical development. For this thesis it will not be
necessary to make any other, except to call attention to
the fact that Plato's fullest discussions of theological
thought occur in the later Dialogues, which, according to
both Lutoslawski and Mackay, represent his deepest and
maturest thought.
d. Development in Thought.
Through the Dialogues , as ranged in this order, there
seems to be a progressive development of thought from
the particular to the general, from the discursive to the
systematic, from the personal to the metaphysical. The
earlier Dialogues are usually centered on some one theme,
are often unrelated to each other, and are, in form, at
least, personal In discussion and application. The Platonic
representation of Socrates introduces the dialectic form,
which doubtless originated in Socrates' actual practice.
He used it for the personal examination of individuals
whode opinions he wished to analyze. Because of concentration
on a particular topic, each dialogue forms a unit, unrelated
to any other. As Plato developed his thought, it became
more general and systematic, so that in the Republic , and
fiaally in the Laws, Irith the related dialogues, there
is more of a definite system of thought propounded;

11
and the second member of the dialogue has become simply
the Interlocutor of the lecturer.
It would be unfair, however, to leave the impression
that this development is absolutely mechanical. It muBt
be recognized by broad tendencies rather than by abrupt
transitions. Shorey, who defends the unity of Plato's
thought, and who contends that he came to a more or less
20
full grasp of his system at an early age, disagrees
with Lutoslawski 's mechanical concept of Plato's style.
21
He agrees that there are fairly well-marked divisions
in his thought: that the Socratic Dialogues are probably
early compositions; that the Re public and its kindred
dialogues belong to Plato's mature thought; and that
the Laws and Tlmaeus are late. Beyond that, he thinks
that the chronology is indeterminable, and that development
22
of thought is untraceable in the Dialogues . He says:
"My thesis is simply thAt Plato, on the whole,
belongs rather to the type of thinker whose philosophy
is fixed in early maturity, than to the class of those
who receive a new revelation every decade."
Furthermore, he contends that the warlier Socratic
Dialogues are "indicative of dramatic design rather than
23
of tentative inquiry." He feels that they represent
Plato's reaction to the pulse of current opinion rather
than any doubts or inquiries which he himself might have
entertained.
It is tnue that the Socratic Dialogues are no
infantile productions. They are the work of a master
hand, whether Socrates', as reported by Plato, or
I
12.
Plato's own. However, there is a more definite systematizatiaon
in his later works than occurs in these earlier productions.
The question of the Socratic element in fohe Dialogues
will be discussed under another head (4a) . It is sufficient
to say here that they have an atmosphere and outlook
different from that of the later works.
Another question of importance arises here. Is the
Lags the product of Plato's best and ripest thought, or
the evidence of decline? There are undeniable differences
between the Republic and the Laws. Shall we consider the
Laws as the writing of his dotage, or as the result of
the revision of concepts put forth in the RePtiibllc?
Zeller cautiously says that "the value of the Laws
24
is not to be lightly estimated." The difference between
the Laws and the Republic in Plato's pessimism concerning
the possibility of the Ideal State, which, he says, is
inhabited only by gods, may have been due to painful
O
experiences in Sicily. Zeller suggests that the work may
have been left unfinished, and h.:,ve been edited by a
later hand.
27
Taylor is more outspoken:
"The composition of five such works as Sophistes
,
Politicus
. Timaeus . Phllebue , Laws, is a notable
achievement for any man between the ages of 67 and
81..... It is an entire misconception to relegate this
last stage in the development of Plato's thought...
to a "senile" year or two subsequent to the close
of Plato's activity as a writer."
28
Jowett, in his introduction to the Laws, remarks that
there is a general decline in stylistic polish manifest in
the Laws, while there is, on the other hand, "a greater

13
insight into human nature, and a greater r^ach of
practical wisdom than in any other of Plato's writings."
The Laws, then, while not the best of Plato's work
from the literary standpoint, is not the querulous
mumbling of senility, but represents the matured thought of
a man whose wisdom is ripened, though he may not express
it with the vigor of his youth. A rejection of Plato's
thought in the Laws on the ground that it was the product
of his declining years would be foolish. The true
approach to the problem lies in more careful interpretation
not in wholesale rejection.
3« Secondary Sources.
A complete list of all secondary sources would be
merely a repetition of the Bibliography. Of those works
which have contributed more than the rest to this thesis,
a more formal notice is necessary.
a. Character.
Sources of all types have been examined. The
Encyclopaedia Brltannlca and the Cambridge Ancient History
have been useful in historical matters. Various histories
of philosophy have supplied information concerning
philosophical thought in the time of Plato. Works on
Greek religion and religious thought have helped in the
orientation of Plato and his beliefs. Various articles
in philosophical magazines and in university research
publications have been of great assistance in the
discussion of minor points In this thesis. Definite

14.
works on Plato and hie thought have been examined for
their bearing on the subject; and lecture notes taken
at various times have been employed to supplement
printed works which have been superseded by more recent
thought,
b. Relation to Subject.
For the preliminary work of this thesis, secondary
sources have been used almost entirely, with the exception of
Chapter I, Section C, on "The Genius of Plato." Chapter
III, which embodies the main content of the thesis, is
based on the primary sources, with occasional reference
to the secondary sources as indicated in the footnotes.
Most of the secondary authorities deal with the
subject at hand only in an incidental way, or else thay have
been employed simply as the sources for the background
of the theme. Many of them bear llffle relation to the
main subject. The exact relationship of each work to
the subject will be indicated in the footnotes. Full
credit is given for all material used.
c. Importance.
One of the most recent sources is Professor Taylor's
Plato : The Man and His Work , which supersedes Jowett's
Introductions to the Dialogues . More's book on The
Religion of Plato , and Calrdjs Evolution of Theology in
the G-reek Philosophers are the two most recent
extended contributions to this field of knowledge,
and are of high importance. Adam's Religious Teachers
Ii
4
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of G-re e ce Is still very useful. Some important work on the
Socratic problem has been published in the Proceedings
of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy .
detailed evaluation of authorities will be given in the
Bibliography
.
4. The Interpretation of Difficult Points.
Before proceeding to the main discussion of the thesis,
there are two points which deserve careful preliminary
treatment: (af The Socratic Element in the Dialogues .
and (b) The Myths of Plato.
a. The Socratic Element in the Dialogues .
Was Socrates or Plato the real author of the philosophy
contained in the Dialogues ? Plato certainly wrote them,
but there is very wide disagreement as to how much of the
thought is Socratic and how much is Platonic. Obviously,
if all the material in the Dialogues which is ascribed to
Socrates is truly and wholly Socratic, little will be
left to us as a criterion of what Plato himself taught 9
Some solution of the problem, satisfactory as a basis for
discussion, must be reached.
There are three main views, all of which are held by
men of good philosophical standing. These views are as
follows
:
01 That the Socrates of Plato, while historic in
the sense that there was such a man, is Simply the
mouthpiece of Plato; and that Plato has used Socrates as
the dramatic character through whose lips he voices

16
his own views, as he voices contrary opinion through the
29
lips of other characters
•
(2) That the Socrates of Plato is a close representation
of the historic Socrates, and that the utterances ascribed to
him are the genuine sentiments of Socrates himself.
That there was an actual Socrates of whom Plato
was a pupil seems to be beyond doubt. According to the
best information that we can secure, he was born about the
30
year 470, the son of Sophroniscus, a citizen of Athens.
He was a man of tremendous physical powers, of temperate,
almost ascetic disposition, and possessed a keen analytic
31
mind. His chief delight in life was in questioning
r
self-important teachers, who prated loudly of their
knowledge of justice, goodness, virtue, and similar
qualities, and in exposing their real ignorance of the
subject. He had a mystical strain in his nature, and
was governed by an "inner light',' a Saj^f err, which
instructed him in the policy that he should pursue in life.
His independent attitude and irritating qu estioning,
together with political enmities, aroused the hatred of
several aristocratic Athenians, who secured his arrest,
and finally his trial and execution. He died in 399 B»C»
This much concerning Socrates stems certain. On
this basis, some very able philosophers have built the
theory that Plato, certainly in the Socratic Dialogues
.
and posribly in the Republic , has given us simply a

17.
report, or at least, an elaboration, of Socrates' teachings.
32
Professor Burnet says:
"I cannot Imagine that the man who could speak
at will in the character of Protagoras, or Gorgias,
or Aristophanes, or Alclblades, without revealing
.
anything of his own personality, should simultaneously
either voluntarily or involuntarily have used Socrates
as a mask for himself ... .The dialogues, in fact,
profess to be pictures of a generation that had
passed away, and that I believe them in the main
to be."
33
Burnet regards the Socratic Blalogues as more or
less exact reports of actual dialogues held by Socrates.
He argues that the divergences of Xenophon and Aristophanes
fro"i Plato in their accounts of Socrates are not to be
taken seriously. Xenophon knew Socrates only for a brief
time anyway, and made no real attempt to write his
biography. Aristophanes, as a comedian and satirist, was
more apt to caricature Socrates than to portray him
accurately.
34
The argument by Burnet is further developed by Dubs.
He holds th^t if we concede originality to Socrates, we
must allow that the report given by Plato is substantially
35
correct.
"There is no case known where the founder of
a great and original movement was himself a second
or third-rate thinker, whose historic importance is
largely due to the fact that he attracted men who
were much more brilliant and original than himself
to elaborate the foundations which he himself had
laid."
Xenophon* s divergence he explains by the statement
that "Xenophon was not a philosopher, and not altogether
36
trustworthy as an historian."

18.
Dubs even go4s so far as to ascribe the doctrine of the
37
Ideas to Socrates* He suggests that if Socrates was so
persistent in pureeing the concepts of which his
contemporaries seemed to have so loose a grasp, he would
not have left unfinished the system which he had begun to
form by first defining the concepts.
Furthermore, he states that if Plato does intrtxluce
extraneous material or original concepts into Socrates'
remarks, he indicates i* by the dramatic expedient of
38
making Socrates say that he "does not know." In other
words, all of the Dialogues are Socratic in which the line
of thought is given by Socrates, and are the product of
his thogght rather than of Plato's.
This is an extreme claim. If all of the Dialogues
except the Laws are the product of Socratic thought,
what becomes of Plato? If, as Burnet urges, Plato is so
versatile as to recreate characters without making his
own personality known, why was he not sufficiently versatile
to express his sentiments through them without revealing
that fact? Again, why is the dilemma of Dubs necessarily
true? Must we assert wither that Plato was merely an
expert reporter, or else that he attributed to Socrates
a philosophy which he had bever held and a character
which he had never attained, even while some of Socrates*
friends were living?
The truth of the matter probably lies in the third
view:
(3) That the Socrates of Plato is to some extent

19.
an historic representation, but that Plato has so developed
his original teaching that the resultant figure is as
much Plato as Socrates,
This view, which may be called the mediating view,
39 . 40
is held by Lutoslawski, Robin, and by some historians
of philosophy. All admit that Socrates is an historical
character, that there is a definite Socratic influence
in Plato, marked by a plainly Socratic stage in the works,
and that this influence is mainly ethical, while the
metaphysical element is Plato's distinct contribution.
41
Robin, in a special study of the Phaedo . thinks
that Plato has given a very fair representation of
Socrates, since he would not have dared to attribute
to him doctrines which he did not hold. Many of Socrates'
friends were living when the dialogue was published, and
they would have resented any misrepresentation of their
master. Rather Plato probably took the teachings which
were really socratic in their origin, developed them
farther than Socrates would have done or did do, and then
put the whole in his mouth, Robin's conclusion is that,
as far as the Phaedo is concerned, the story of the
imprisonment and execution of Socrates is doubtless fact,
while the rest of the work is the thought of Plato cast
in the form of a Socratic dialogue, and developed as he
thought Socrates would have developed it.
This same line of argument is valid for the Republic.
Although the narrative is put in the mouth of Socrates,
we cannot shake off the feeling that the rtal Socrates
4
20.
does not figure very largely in the dialogue* Why could
not Socrates be the mouthpiece of Plato in the Phaedo
as well as in the Republic?
How shall we determine which is Socrates and which is
41
Plato? Fisher thinks that it cannot bu done, and says:
"In passing to Plato, we do not leave Socrates;
but it is not possible to draw the line, in the
Platonic dialogues, between the teaching of the
master, and the ideas of the more speculative disciple."
Nevertheless, Plato is responsible for the record. It
se^ms fair to say that the beliefs expressed in the
Dialogues through the mouth of Socrates represent nothing
contrary to Plato's own beliefs. Doubtless he owed many
of his germinal ideas to Socrates; perhaps the Platonic
idealism was the natural outgrowth of the hypostatlzation
of the Socratic concept or definition. The Dialogues
probably preserve the actual dialectic method of Socrates
in their literary form. Yet, since the record 14 Plato's,
the original tenets of Socrates are colored and developed
by Plato's genius, so that the resultant product is as
much Plato's as Socrates'. If that is the case, we may
continue investigation without fearing that we shall be
attributing to Plato beliefs of Socrates which Plato
himself did not hold.
b. The Myths of Plato.
For the most part, the Platonic Dialogues consist
of plain, straightforward, compact reasoning, wither in
the form of question and answer, or of interrupted
discourse, with here and there a quotation of poetry,
•
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a jest, or some repartee to lighten the burden of thought.
Several times, however, Plato adopts a different form of
42
expression, the Myth. "The Myth," Stewart says, "is a
fanciful tale, sometimes traditional, sometimes newly
invented, with which Socrates, or some other interlocutor
interrupts or concludes the argumentative conversation
in which the movement of the Drama [The Platonic Dialogue^
mainly consists."
These Myths are cast in non-philosophical terminology,
and are difficult to evaluate, since it is not known how
far Plato would apply tne principles which they embody.
For instance, the myth of Er is the account of a soldier
who fell in battle and was taken home to be given a
military burial. On the twelfth day after his supposed
death, as he was being laid on the funeral pyre, he
returned to consciousness . He related a tale of the
travel of his soul through the world of the dead; of the
Judgment of the Just and unjust, t.nd of the choice of souls
of types of lives in which they should be incarnated. Very
evidently the myth is intended to Inculcate the habit of
virtuous choice. But beyond that, how seriously shall we
consider it? Did it actually embody Plato's conception of
the world to come, or did he merely use it as a common
tale to illustrate the point of his argument? Are its
geographical details actual places to Plato, or fanciful
in character? The moral which he draws is unmistakable;
but i£ one is studying his eschatology, the answer is not
so easy.
i4
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That the myth is more than a fairy story seems plain.
It is "....an organic part of the Platonic Drama, not
44
an added ornament." It may be grotesque, as Aristophanes'
45
story in the Symposium , or curiously realistic, as the
46 47
Myth of Er, or cosmolfcgical, like the Myth of the Timaeus.
The form does not matter; the story has a point, and Plato
meant that it should. What is the point?
The myth in Plato is probably a poetical device whereby
Plato wishes to carry hfljrae his truth to the reader's
consciousness without going through the painful maze of
argumentation. He wishes to penetrate deeper than logic
48
will go. "It is a literary device for teaching those
49
subjects not susceptible of a scientific explanation."
It may be that Plato used the myth as a vehicle of what he
felt to be truth, though he was incapable of supporting
his feelings by logical proof, and that in the margin of
uncertainty which surrounds the interpretation ofi the
myth, we have a reflection of the uncertainty in Plato's
50
own mind.
Of these myths fully half relate to the discussion
of theism. In these the being and nature of G-od is
discussed, and His relation to the world set forth.
Stewart thinks this good reason for questioning Plato's
51
theism.
"The truth is, that however Plato represents
God- and he sometimes represents Him in immense
cosmic outlines, sometimes on a smaller scale and
more anthropomorphically- the representation is
always for the imagination, mythical."
If this be true, it apparently destroys all
possibility of deriving any accurate theistic conception
•
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from Plato. The line between sober fact and hopeful fancy
must be so tenuous and wavering that no final conclusion
can be drawn.
The danger is not so greet as it appears to be. The
myths are not all of Plato. If we find in our investigation
that the terminology of the myths, which is not simply
accidental or illustrative, but which is essential to an
understanding of the principle which the myth itself
illustrates, agrees with the terminology used elsewhere
in passages which are manifestly non-mythical, we saall
be justified in admitting it as a criterion of Plato's
thought. Not all terms or thoughts emplpyeck in the myths
are illusory. Because the terra Sod appears in a myth, it is
not necessary to conclude that Plato regarded Deity as fiction.
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I. PLATO: HIS LIFE AND TIMES.
A* The Age of Plato.
The century and a quarter which elapsed between the
birth of Socrates and the death of Plato (469-247 B.C.)
was, for Greece, a period that has seldom ifi ever been
equalled in the history of any other country. The Fifth
Century was "the period in which Hellenic civilization
52
shone forth with greatest brilliancy." In politics, in
philosophy, in commerce, in literature, in science, and
53
in religion it was a period of expansion and illumination.
The period really began with the close of the Persian
Wars. The successful repulse of the invaders in the battles
54
of Platea and Myfiale, in 479 B.C., guaranteed the
independence of Greece from foreign control, and afforded
an opportunity for internal development and outward
expansion such as had not existed before. The intensity of
the struggle had evoked the best powers of the Greek
mind. Success in the military venture against the strongest
and most magnificent armies of the known world had given
them confidence in their own powers. The spoils of war
afforded the means for civic improvements which Athens
introduced, even against the jealous opppsition of
55
neighboring states. All of these factors contributed to
the growth of the new state, the Athenian Empire.
The Athenian Empire, in its greatest glory, lasted
56
from 479 to 431 B.C. Athens, under the leadership of the
able statesman, Pericles, and of other scarcely less
V
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noted colleagues, became the supreme state in Greece.
The Delian League, ofiginally composed of a large number
of free states grouped around Athens, was gradually
transformed into a maritime empire somewhat similar to
the British Empire of our own time. Athens was strongly
fortified; its seaport, the Piraeus, was made into a naval
and shipping base, connected with the city itself by long
walls with a roadway between them. The Acropolis was adorned
53
with splendid new public buildings and tenples. The
Athenian fleet commanded the sea, and commerce flourished.
Athens was the leading city of the world.
It did not lack rivals, nowever. While Athens held the
naval supremacy of Greece, Sparta held the military supremacy.
Though Athens and Sparta had been allies in the Persian
War, the alliance was at best grudging, and was marked by
suspicion and treachery on both sides. When Athens seized
the opportunity of gaining command of commerce by her
fleet, and gradually became the dictator of Greece,
Sparta was restive and jealous. In 431 a war broke out
between the two which was carried on for twenty-seven
years. It terminated in 404 B.C. in an ignominious peace
59
which left Athens the virtual subject of Sparta.
After an interim pf Spartan supremacy, Athens
60
succeeded in regaining some of her former power. She
61
revived the Delian Confederacy in 377 B.C. By leaving
Sparta and Thebes to fight with each other, while she
remained neutral, Athens managed to enjoy comparative
peace, until the conquest of Greece by the Macedonians,
62
which closed. the Classic Epoch.
J
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Politically , the period was brilliant and unstable.
The government was a democracy, the closest possible
approach to popular sovereignty. All proposed policies
of state were proposed to the assembly of the people, who
voted on each question. Legislative and judicial power
belonged to the Assembly: all officers were commissioned
by the people; and tenure of office was contingent upon
public confidence.
The cultural results of this type of government left
a lasting impression upon Greek life, though the form of
the government varied somewhat in character. It produced
a citizenry thoroughly versed in politics, and leaders
who possessed literary as well as administrative talents.
Correct and beautiful speech was a necessity rather than
a luxury to any man who aspired to a place of honor.
Clear and logical thought was essential in guiding the
policies of government. Since all shared to some extent in
public speech and in public administration, the consequent
activity tended to produce minds of a high grade of
64
intelligence
.
Because of its commercial supremacy, Athens naturally
became the clearing-house of foreign news and of foreign
thought. "Athens was now becoming the intellectual capital
of Greece, the place where ideas were exchanged and Hellenic
public opinion created; drawing from the periphery savants
and thinkers of all kinds, and appreciating them. It is
significant that she became the chief center of the book
65
trade in Greece."
##
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Not only did commerce introduce new teachers, but
also it supplied the means whereby the knowledge of the
physical world was broadened. Exploration and trade go
hand in hand. As the Athenians travelled more and more
widely in search of business, geographers charted their
66
travels, and thereby enlarged the horizon of thinking.
Plato himself was a traveller. The racial contacts began
to destrpy provincialism, and to promote something like
world-consciousness.
The wealth of spoil remaining from the Persian Wars,
together with the new national pride which they created,
favored the development of art. Architecture, sculpture,
and painting were brought to a high degree of perfection
67
during thie period. The sculptures of Pheidias, Calarais,
68 69
and Myron, and later, Praxiteles and Scopas, and the
paintings of Zeuxis and Parrhasius, reveal an amazing skill
on the part of the people. The lyric poetry of Simonides
67
and Pindar appeared soon after the Persian Wars. Dramatic
68 69 70
poetry under Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and, later,
Aristophanes, history under Herodotus and Thucydides and
Xenophon, oratory under Pericles, Isocrates, Lysias, and
68 71
Demosthenes, philosophy under Parmenldes, Zeno,
Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Socrates, and Plato,
all were |>art of the brilliant intellectual glory of this
age
.
Like all other periods of enlightenment, it was an age
of rationalism. The rise of democracy with its free
discussion, the rise of commerce, with its wide exploration,
the rise of imperialism, with its sense of dominion,
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produced a rebellion against the old methods and habits
of thought. Skepticism was prevalent everywhere. Protagoras,
one of the leading Sophists, said: "Concenning the gods,
I am unable to say whether they exist or not; nor, if they
do, what they are like; there are many things that hinder us
72
from knowing."
It was an age of turmoil. Conservatives and radicals
battled for their viewa in the fields of politics, philosophy,
and religion. Hereby trials were frequent; Socrates was not
the only sufferer, though "they [the heresy trials] were
73
generally prompted by some other motive than blasphemy."
Doctors began teaching that diseases were due to natural
74
causes. Historians took the same attitude: the super-
naturalism of Herodotus disappears in the polite indifference
of Thucydides and in the gossipy journalism of Xenophon.
Yet again, the fifth century witnessed a great development
of cult. Olympia and Delphi were very popular u8 religious
75
centers, and the Mystery Religions grew apace.
This period in wnich Plato lived and wrought was a
period of commercial expansion, of political upheaval, and
of Intellectual restlessness and dissatisfaction. It was
an age in which genius flourished on every hand, and was
to some degree appreciated. It is small wonder that with
such remarkable contemporaries and with such a spirit in
the air Plato reached the success that was his.
r•
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B. The Career of Plato.
We know comparatively little of the biography of Plato.
Only occasionally does he refer directly to himself in the
Dialogues . Most of the information which we gain from them
is derived from indirect statements and from inferences.
The period covered by the Epistles covers only the latter
part of his life. Of the four biographers of Plato, Apulelus,
Diogenes Laertlus, Olympiodorus, and an anonymous writer,
76
the last two are late; and not one of them is very reliable.
Our sources are fragmentary at best.
77
Plato was born in 427 B.C. in the month Thargelion
78
(toy-June). According to some authorities, he was born in
79 80
Athens; according to others, in Aegina. His father, Ariston,
boasted of descent from Codrus, the last king of Athens;
and his mother, Perictione, claimed kinship with Solon,
and was closely related to the leaders of the aristocratic
party in Athens. He had two brothers, Adeimantus and Glaucon,
and a sister, Potone. His father died while he was still a
youth; and his mother married Pyrilampus, by whom she had
78
another son, Antiphon.
Whether or not Plato inherited any wealth from his
father is uncertain. He evidently had the best education that
Athens could afford, together with the cultural background
and training which inhere in a family of good birth and
81 82
breeding. He studied music, painting, and poetry,
and became sufficiently proficient in the last named
subject to write verses, which, however, he consigned
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to the flames when he met Socrates. His poetic nature
and literary training are both evident in the method and
diction employed in his Dialogues .They contain certain
literary devices, such as the myths, which reveal that
the writer had a poet's understanding of the world; and
the smootnness and delicacy of their style show that
the writer must have had some rhetorical training,
82
Some of hie early years were spent in the army,
which was actively enggged at that time in the Peloponnesian
War. was noted for his physical prowess. He contended
in the games as a wrestler; and from the breadth of his
shoulders was nicknamed Plato, instead of Aristofcles, his
proper name. There are indications that he taught school
for a while, and specialized in letters, gymnastics, and
85
music.
He might have been either a school-teacher or, more
likely, a politician, had he not come under the influence
of Socrates. Moved partly by disgust at the fickle
84
democratic government, and partly by his own deep interest
in the personality and dialectic of Socrates, he abandoned
his former activities, and devoted himself to the pursuit
86
of philosophy. For eight years he was a disciple of Socrates.
The treatment of Socrates by the parties of his day convinced
87
Plato that there was no place for hln in government office;
at the death of Socrates, in 399 B.C., he went abroad.
Just where he travelled and how long he stayed in any
83
one place is a matter of conjecture. According to tradition,
89
he spent a brief time at Megara among the philosophers.
From Megara he went to Egypt. Egypt interested him, tradition
says.
<•
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The age and permanency of its culture, the aristocratic
form of government, the division of labor into the artisan
classes, and compulsory education, all of which he
observed for himself, impressed him. It may have given him
90
the suggestions that he later developed in the Re public .
From Egypt he went to Cyrene. There he met Theodorus, a
mathematician and friend of Protagoras, who brought him
into contact with Protagorean thought.
The most Important part of Plato's sojourn abroad was
his visit to Sicily, Dionysus I, ruler of Sicily, was a
self-made king. From the position of an underling he had
risen to the throne; and though he was a despot, he was an
enlightened despot. He was himself an author, and favored
culture. Archytas, prince of Tarentum, was not only a noted
statesman, but also an accomplished musician, a learned
mathematician, and a physicist as well. Dion, the son-in-law
of Dionysus, and heir-apparent to the throne, took kindly
to Plato s teaching. Furthermore, Sicily was the home of
the Pythagoreans, whose mathematical philosophy Plato
admired. His contacts in Sicily broadened his outlook, and
deepened his knowledge, and furnished him with raw
material for thought.
Due, possibly, to a tiff with the Athenians over
their rejection ofi his literary productions, of to the
fact that Plato had gained too great an ascendancy over
Dion, he was expelled from the country. The authenticity of
this tradition is Uncertain. The story is that Plato was
set ashore at Aegina, which w.s then at war with Athens.
3
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The Aeglnetans sold him Into slavery, from which, he was
92 93
ransomed by Abniceris, a Cyrenean. However that may he,
it is certain that after about ten years' wandering he
returned to Athens in 389 B.C.
Upon nis return to Athens, a group of disciples gathered
about him, and he founded a school in a grove outside the
city, called the Academy. Here he lectured and wrote,
94
and probably varied his program occasionally by symposia *
From 367 to 360 B.B. Plato was absent in Sicily, where
he was engaged in training Dionysus II, the young king of
Syracuse, for the position of ruler. For a time he enjoyed
success; but political opposition and the weakness of the
young ruler finally forced him to withdraw from Sicily, He
had hoped to establish an ideal state by education, and
96.
had failed.
In 360 B.C. Plato returned to Athens, where he was
95
busy in the Academy until his death. Aristotle was one of his
pupils. He may have had others associated with him in the
work of teaching, but doubtless he superintended the
activities of the school. A large part of this time was
devoted to writing; and the last few Dialogues are dated
at this epoch. The Academy was a center for scientific
thought in the fourth century, and was influential for
97
some time after Plato's decease.
Plato died in 347 B.C., after a long and fruitful career.
In summing up his life we may say that he brought to the
task of philosophy a mind of the highest order, an
experience rich and varied, and a unique training in
literature and dialectic. By birth, by education, and
•
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by environment, he was well fitted for the task which he
undertook.
C» The G-enlus of Plato.
The remarkable progress of the last century in
philosophy and in scientific thought has tended to make us
moderns a little scornful of the ancients. Their philosophy
seems to us naive, and their science, crude. We forget that,
whereas we attack the problems of the universe with the
equipment which the thought and experience of past
generations have furnished, the ancients had to make their
own equipment, and had to spend much of their energy in
exploring and in defining those fields of investigation
in which we now concentrate. There was less division of
labor in philosophy and in science. Each man tried to deal
with the cosmos as a whole. In consideration of the
magnitude of their task and of the poverty of their
equipment, greater credit is due to these pioneer
explorers of the realm of thought than to their modern
followers
.
It might be unwise to claim for Plato the first place
among ancient philosophers, but certainly he belongs with
the front rank. In scope and originality of thought, in
clarity of expression, in beauty of style, and in influence
on succeeding generations he has no superiors and few
equals. Though his philosophy was by no means flawless,
he did succeed in doing two things: he advanced beyond
his predecessors in giving humanity a prominent place in
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his philosophy and in making it part of the cosmos; and
he developed the first philosophy of Idealism.
As a religious teacher, we shall have more to say of
him in the next two chapters. *t will suffice to remark
here that the Mediaeval church regarded him as the most
enlightened of the pagan writers, and adapted much of his
99
philosophy to Christian use. Burnet says:
"Plato brought the idea of God into philosophy
for the first time, and the form that the doctrine
took was that G-od was a living soul, and that G-od was
good.
"
That contribution alone would make him great.
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II. PLATO AND THE GODS OF CONTEMPORARY BELIEF.
A. The Olympian Religion and His Critique of It.
The Olympian religion, as we know it, is largely the
product of Homer and Hesiod, who, as Herodotus says,
"created the generations of the gods for the Greeks; gave
the divinities their names, assigned to them their pre-
100
rogatives and functions, and made their forms known."
This does not mean that Homer and Hesiod created the
Olympian religion out of their imaginations, They mecely
reduced to concrete form majiy of the current myths which
were the expression of popular oellef concerning the gods.
Of these two writers, Homer was especially influential
in the time of Plato. His words were repeated everywhere
by the rhapsodes, who found ready audience for their
talents when they read selections from the Iliad and the
Odyssey . The Ion . while probably not a genuine dialogue of
Plato, is doubtless trustworthy in the picture that it
gives of the rhapsode, who tells how the poeple listened
101
breathlessly to his reproduction of passages from Homer,
Plato quotes frequently from Homer as from a household poet.
The Iliad and Odyssey were the chief popular literature of
Greece, and were influential in molding popular thought
102
and popular education.
Because of their universal popularity they were
universally influential. While it is doubtful i£ the
10
Homeric writings were ever regarded as infallible Scriptures,
they did tend to form a reli5ion which unified the local
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cults into a common pantheon, and wtiich fixed the personal
104
characteristics of the deities. Vfhile every city-state
and every village had its local shrine at which the patron
god of the city was worshiped, the potency of other gods
bedide its own was recognized; and usually the patron
selected was some member of the Olympian pantheon,
Athens worshiped Athena, Argos worshiped Hera, and so on,
105
Yet the deities were not necessarily bound to localities.
While each might be worshiped especially in one or more
places, each was recognized by all the Greeks as deity, and
was so reverenced.
The gods of the Olympian pantheon were simply magnified
men and women, who possessed certain prerogatives which
mortals did not enjoy. They were larger, wiser, and more
powerful than men* though not even Zeus, according to Homer,
was omniscient or omnipotent. They were Immortal; but were
not beyond bodily needs, for they are described as eating,
sleeping, and as requiring light in order to see. Their
emotions were like those of men. They were capable of
Jealousy, of anger, and of lust. They suffered pain, and
on some occasions, were subject to the attacks of mortals.
Nor were they free from Fate, which held the destinies of
106
both gods and men. There Wc.s no fixed system of theology,
nor were the relations of gods and men based on anything
107 108
more than capricious attachment of the one for the other.
From the standpoint of the gods, the Olympian religion was
largely a matter of favoritism.
4
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In the period in which Plato lived, from 500 to 338
109
B.C., the Olympian religion was at its height. The victory
no
of the Greeks at Salamis inspired gratitude to the gods,
who, the Greeks thought, had aided them by their timely
111
intervention. Temples, the noblest of which was the
Parthenon, were built, and were filled with spoils dedicated
to the deities. Statues of the gods wtr'e set up everywhere.
The Homeric religion became a part cf State ritual, and of
public education. By the time of Plato's birth it was an
112.
accepted institution.
Plato, however, did not accept the Homeric religion as
a whole, r.or did he summarily reject is as a whole. It
would be more accurate to say that he outgrew it than to
say that he repudiated it. He began by attempting to purify
113
it; he ended by rising above it.
Plato's criticism of the Olympian religion was chiefly
114
ethical. In the Euthyphro he related a dialogue between a
young Athenian and Socrates on the subject of piety. The
young man had entered suit against his father for his
treatment of a slave who had died from the effects of severe
punishment. In the face of criticism for impiety in
prosecuting his gather, Euthyphro averred that he was
performing a pious deed, since he ought to prosecute a
wrong-doer, even though the wrong-doer was his own father.
In defence of his position, he cited the example of Zeus,
"the best and most righteous of the gods, (who) bound his
father (Cronos) because he wickedly devoured his own sons." 11
The reply of Socratee illustrates Plato's attitude. He said:
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"May not this be the reason, Euthtyph.ro, why I am
charged with impiety- that I cannot away with these
stories about the gods? and therefore I suppoee taat
people think me wrong I wish you would tell me
whether you really believe that they are true."
Euth.
"Yes, Socrates, and things more wonderful still of
which the world is in ignorance."
Soc.
"And do you really believe that the gods fought
with one another, and had dire quarrels, battles, and
the like, as the poete say?*.. .Are all these tales of
the gods true, Euthyphro?"
While this utterance expressed little more than a
polite incredulity on the part of Plato, or Socrates, as
the case may be, it does reveal a definite distrust of the
ethics of the Olympian religion. Plato was clearly dis-
satisfied with its moral aspects, and was looking for
something better.
In the Republic this criticism was expressed more
definitely and more emphatically. The very same reference
to Cronos which Euthyphro made was repeated; and the story
was stigmatized as the greatest of all lies. Such stories
are
"...not to be narrated in our State: the young
man should not be told that in committing the worst
of crimes he is far from doing anything outrageous,
and that he may chastise his father when he does
wrong in any manner that he likes, and in this will
only be following the example of the first and
greatest among the gods." 116
In the following context the same general criticism
is applied to oth^r phases of moral life exhibited in the
writings of Homer and Hesiod. Plato rejected the plots and
fightings of the gods as untrue. He denied that Zeus is the
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author of both good and evil, and that the gods change
their forms to deceive men. Moral imperfections in the gods
are intolerable.
A second criticism of the Olympian religion is that It
favors injustice.
"If, on the other hand, there are no feods, or if
they have no care for what mankind is doing, why should
we trouble ourselves about concealment? And if, on the
other hand, they do exist and have a care for men, yet
all we know about them is from law and custom, and
from the genealogical tables of the poets, and from
these we learn that they can be cajoled and diverted
by 'sacrifice and sootaing prayers' and offerings.
By justice we shall simply co$e off unscathed from
the gods, we shall have our gain, and still, with
prayers and propitiations, shall come off unscathed
through transgression and sin," 117
If, then, the unjust man can escape the penalty of his deeds
by an appeal to the gods, of what use is righteousness?
Plato felt that the Olympian religion was as harmful in
precepts as in example.
Nevertheless, Plato did allow a secondary place to
118
the Olympian religion. Zeus was still the god of strangers
119
and Hera the goddess of marriage. In the State, the
offerings to the gods were not abolished as Idolatrous,
but were merely simplified to bring them within the means
121
of men whose resources were limited. In the Tlmaeus
the existence of the sods was regognlzed, but it is
secondary. This seems to have been Plato's concession to
those who wished to retain the Olympian pantheon.
122
A confirmation of this may be found cn the Laws .
"But seeing that we are not like the ancient
legislators, who gave laws to demigods and sond
of gods, being themselves, according to the popular
*»
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belief, the offspring of gods...."
The Olympian religion might be satisfactory as a popular
faith, its phraseology might be useful to express popular
feeling; but it could never command a place in any rationally
planned and rationally governed society. Plato included
it in the Laws as a concession to popular weakness.
B. The Mystery Religions.
The Olympian religion was not the only type of faith
popular among the Greeks of Hato's age; in fact, it may
be said that during Plato's lifetime is was beginning to
lose its hold upon popular feeling and imagination. Plato's
criticisms were not his alone* they had been voiced in
various forms by other philosophers before him and by the
dramatists. The Homeric deities, who dwelt in lofty
Olympus, and regarded men as so many pawns upon the
chess~board of life, and who fraternized only with heroes,
did not satisfy the demand for a more intimate religious
experience. Contemporary with the Olympian religion were
the Mystery religions, which grew out of it, and tended to
supplant it in some quarters. In the Hellenistic Age they
superseded it almost completely; in Plato's time they were
already powerful, though still young.
There were three important mystery Cults existing in
the Athenian commonwealth. The first and oldest of these
was the Eleusinian mastery, or mysteries. Their origin
is obscure. Some think that they came from Egypt,
•
41.
Possibly they were aft Inheritance from an earlier
civilization. However that may be, they were developed
124
at Eleusis, a small town near Athens, where stood the
temple dedicated to their observance, and where the
Initiates gathered every year to celebrate the festival.
Their worship centered around Demeter, the Corn-
Mother, and Kore. Plouton, the masculine member of the
125
trio, was in the background. They were considered to
be generally benevolent tn their disposition to mankind,
126
but by nature dangerous to approach. Demeter and Plouton
were sometimes called r\ $e<\ and o 6eos , "the personal
names being omitted from the feeling of reverential
shyness which was specially felt in regard to the
sacred names of deities of the underworld."
A full description of the rites observed is unnecessary.
The mysteries were not a state of family cult, but an
individual matter. Each individual joined the mystic
127
brotherhood on his own initiative and on his own merits.
128
There were four stages in the mystery religions:
1. Preliminary purification.
2. Communication of mystic knowledge,
3» Revelation of holy things.
4. Crowning of mystic.
The ceremonies were highly symbolic, and were supposed to
give to the worshiper a mystic participation in divine
truth, a contact with deity which the externalities of
the Olympian religion never afforded. Farnell suggests
that the Eleusinlan mysteries may have held out to the
129
worshiper the hope of immortality.
"In the Eleusinian as in Egyptian eschatology,
the token of the growing corn may have served as an
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emblem- though not as a proof- of man's resurrection."
The Dionyslkac mysteries were carried by migration from
130
Thrace to Asia Minor, and came thence to Greece. By the
sixth century they had been accepted as a public cult in
131
most of the Greek communities. Dionysys was a nature divinity
whose death was seen in winter and whose life returned in
spring. The rites by which he was worshiped were orgiastic,
a frenzied attempt through wine and dancing to achieve
132 133
union with the god. To the wild conduct of the women
134
in the Bacchic dance we owe the allusion made in the Ion.
The third and most outstanding of the Mystery
religions was Orphism, an offshoot of the Dlonysiac
135
cult. The place of its origin is uncertain. Possibly it
developed in Southern Italy, where in Plato's time it
was fostered by the Pythagoreans in conjunction with
their mathematical philosophy. Its real center was in
Athens. It had a more definite body of beliefs than the
Eleuslnian mysteries, and was better organized than the
Dionysiac religion.
Its beliefs, as far as we know, contained a number
of concepts which marked a definite advance in religious
thought. It was built on the myth of Zagreus, or Dionysus,
who was torn to pieces and eaten by the Titans, but whose
heart was rescued, and was given a new body and a new
136
life by Zeus. From this fable, the Orphics drew their
teaching that the body is Titanic, or evil, while the
soul, which is immortal, is Dionysiac, or good. The
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divine soul is, then, incarcerated in an evil body, from
137
which it must liberate itself as best it can.
After death, the soul entered Hades, where it was
regarded or punished, according to its behaviour. Merit
or demerit was judged by observance of religious
regulations. In due season it entered upon another
incarnation, until eventually it might complete its
labors and attain bliss.
The Orphic conception of deity was a rather vague
pantheism, verging on monotheism. Since only fragments
of the Orphic writings remain, it is not possible to say
positively what was their belief concerning God. The least
138
that can be said is that it was not polytheistic.
Plato owed much to the Mystery religions. His doctrine
of immortality, especially as illustrated by the myth
139
of Er, bears a very strong resemblance to Orphic beliefs.
140
Some other passages in the Dialogues have an Orphic coloring.
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Yet he criticizes severely their orgiastic character:
"There is a tradition or story which has somehow
gone about the world, that Dionysus was robbed of his
wits by his step-mother, Hera, and that in revenge
for this he inspires Bacchic furies and dancing
madnesses in others; for which reason he gave men
wine. Such traditions concerning the gods I leave to
those who think that they may safely be uttered."
Plato was much more cautious about adopting the
theology of the Orphics and Pythagoreans than he was about
142
adopting their esch&tology. If we may Judge from the
negative criticisms of the prevailing theological systems,
he was satisfied with none of them. Even though he
borrowed the Olympian terminology and the Mystery
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eschatology , he repudiated the anthropomorphism of both.
In all of his discussions of such matters, he adhered
to philosophical method. Though he often was poetic in
expression, he was rational in basic thought, and relied
on dialectic for his method, as in his discussion of
143
immortality in the Fhaedo . Moore says:
"Plato went beyond his predecessors because:
1. He gave an intellectual basis to belief by showing
that rational soul is of the same nature and
substance as the Absolute.
2. In place of taboos fee substituted a noble discipline."
C. Plato and the Philosophers.
Prior to Plato's time philosophy had dealt with
religion in a negative and half-hearted manner. It had
paid comparatively lilittle attention to the problem of
the relationship between God and men. The concept of
deity in philosophy was an outgrowth of eosmology, the
answer which thinkers gave to the problems which they
faced in accounting for the diversity and motion of matter.
The Milesian School, the first of which we have any
record, had little to say on the subject. Thales taught
that there was a permanent Underlying substance, a soul
144
that was the cause of movement. Not too much weight
can be attached to his words, since they are second-hand
at best, and cannot be understood properly without their
145 146
original context. Anaximander and Anaxiraenes had
bothing to contribute. The interest of the Milesian
School was scientific and cbsmological. Te.eir
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comparative neglect of Ibheology marked the beginning of
non-religious thought, and paved the way for a new approach
to theism.
The Eleatlc School was, if anything, naturalistic.
147
Xenophanes rejected the anthropomorphism of the Olympian
religion. The concept of God which he substituted for it
is so vague that his meaning is uncertain; and from the
statement that this god is "....similar to mortals neither
in form nor in mind," we might fairly deduce that
Xenophanes was an agnostic. It may be only a statement
148 149
of pantheism.
Parmenides, another member of the Eleatie School, was
an absolute raonist. "In the center of all is the Goddess
150
that governs all things," he says. Aristotle quotes him
150
as holding that "The One is God." Parmenides' Being,
however, was a metaphysical rather than a theological
con cept
.
Heracleitus, who is generally put in a class by
himself, and who was the opponent of Parmenides, did not
151
conceive of a personal God. Fire, the principle of change,
he called God; the Homeric theology and the Mystery religions
152
he rejected utterly.
Empedocles and Anaxagoras introduced a new concept:
God as Mind, or, perhaps, Mind as God. Empedocles, liEe
Xenophanes, rejected anthropomorphism:
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"We cannot bring G-od near us so as to reach
him with our eyes or lay hold of him with our hands-
the [two ways! along which the chief highway of
persuasion leads into the mind of man.... For he
has no human head attached to bodily members,
nor do two branching arms dangle from his shoulders;
he has neither feet nor swift knees nor any hairy
parts. No, he is only mind, sacred and ineffable
mind, flashing through the whole universe with
swift thoughts." 155
Anaxagoras introduced mind (vovs ) into his philosophy
154
to account for the changes, diversity, and motion of matter,
155
The irodb was not personal, but was eternal. Anaxagoras
did not develop this principle, but he supplied a
germinal idea which Plato later developed into idealism.
156
Pythagorean ism was a curious combination of
emotional Orphism and abstract mathematics. The Pythagoreans
attributed the origin of all things to the One, and "were
157
the first to think and call the Universe an order."
Since the philosophy of these predecessors of Plato
was metaphysical rather than theological, and since its
criticism of the Olympian deities was so drastic, it is
easy to understand the two opposing tendencies in
philosophy which we find in the time of Plato. In the
turmoil of the last third of the fifth century, during the
Pefcoponnesian War, old beliefs and Institutions were
losing their hold on the people. Society, government, and
158.
religion were matters of public discussion and debate.
On the one hand, the agnostic tendency of philosophy
appears in the Sophists. Protagoras, a leading Sophist
of his day, was faankly a skeptic. "With regard to the
•
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gods, I know not whether they exist or not, or what they
are like. Many things prevent our knowing; the subject
159
is obscure, and brief is the span of mortal life."
Prodicus maintained that the gods were natural powers.
Critias, a relative of Plato, held that they were
160
invented to restrain evildoers.
On the other hand, there was a very definite
movement toward theism, of which Socrates and Plato were
161
the leaders. Says Fisher:
"Socrates e,sserted the doctrine of theism, and
taught and exemplified the spiritual nature of
religion. It is true that he believed in 'gods many
and lords many*' Eut he believed in one supreme
personal being to whom the deepest reverence was to
be paid."
Perhaps this statement credits Socrates with more
than belongs to him. Nevertheless, it seems safe to day
that with Socrates and Plato began the theistic thought
162
of the Greek philosophy.
This theistic thought of Plato apparently developed
out of his CFiticlsm of the Homeric and Mystery religions,
of which we have already spoken, and out of his criticism
of contemporary philosophy. Of the philosophers and
schools of philosophers enumerated in the preceding
paragraphs, Parmemldes, Anaxagoras, and Socrates were
contemporary, while Xenophanes, Heracleitpe, and
Pythagoras had Just closed their careers by the time of
Socrates' birth. It is concerning theee contemporaries
of Socrates that Plato has most to say. Concerning the
Milesian school he has no comments of note to offer.
t
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Apparently he felt that they had no contributions worth
noting.
Plato's criticism of Anaxagoras Is given as a statement
163
of Socrates. Socrates had heard that Anaxagoras had
written a book in which he stated that "mind was the
disposer and cause of all." Socrates, quite delighted at
the prospect of finding in mind an explanation of the
motions of the universe, pursued an eager investigation
of the book or bookB. He was disappointed in Anaxagoras'
failure to utilize mind as causal, and in his recourse
to materialistic theories.
Whether this criticism be Socratic or Platonic in
origin, it indicates three things: first, that Plato
was dissatisfied with a materialistic explanation of
the universe; second, that he had a definite theistic
bias; and third, that he, or Socrates, was a careful
investigator of other men's opinions. The reference
164
to Anaxagoras is repeated in the Cratylus . which
indicates that the reference in the Phaeflo was not
merely a passing allusion, but that the principle which
Anaxagoras failed to develop drew the attention of
Socrates and Plato, and suggested the line of thought
which appears more fully in the later Dialogues .
Of Heracleitus Plato offers little or no direct
criticism. Plato credits him, in company with Homer, of
having advanced the doctrine that all reality is motion
165
and flux. The immediate context has little or nothing
«
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to do with Plato's doctrine of theism j yet it seems that
the Heraclitean doctrine affected Plato at least indirectly,
166
Caird states that "the conception oB an absolute
principle of unity in the universe which is deeper than
any of the special forms of existence was the earliest
thought of Greek philosophy." It was advanced by Xenophanes,
who attacked anthropomorphism, and by Heracleitus, who
developed reality as the changeless law of change. These,
167
Caird says, give a pantheistic view of the universe.
Sudh a view is the natural result of a philosophy which is
partially built on a reaction against anthropomorphism
and partially built on physical theory. Plato carried
his thought much farther; but these same two elements
appear in it. His reaction against anthropomorphism
appears in hie criticism of the Homeric deities; his
discussion of God and the physical theory in the Timaeus.
The Pythagoreans contributed somewhat to Plato's
concept of God in that their ascetic method of
philosophizing probably strengthened his tendency to
168
idealism* In the Phaedfc Plato says:
"....All experience shows that if we would
have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit
of the body, and the soul herself must behold all
things in themselves In this present life, I
reckon that we must make the nearest approach to
knowledge when we have the least possible concern
or interest in the body, and are not saturated with
the bodily nature, but remain pure until the hour
when God himself is pleased to release us."
Philosophy as a guide to reality led Plato to the study
of idealism.

Plato's criticism of the Sophists was chiefly
epistemologlcal . He objected to the statement of
Protagoras, who was fairly representative of his school,
t69
that "Man is the measure of all things." Plato
considered opinion as an inadequate criterion of judgment
and his reductlo ad absurdum of Protagoras' dictum
reveals his feeling. This uncertainty of a moral standard
led Plato to seek some other criterion. He complains
that "....the truth of Protagoras, being doubted by all,
170
will be true neither to himself nor to any one else."
170a
Where, then, is truth? Here is his answer:
"Let them hear the truth: In God is no
unrighteousness at all- he is altogether righteous;
and there is nothing more like him than he is of us,
who is the most righteous. And the true wisdom of
man, and their nothingness and cowardice are nearly
concerned with this. For to know this is true
wisdom and manhood, and the ignorance is too plainly
folly and vice .
"
The criterion for truth is the divine nature. Plato
opposes Protagoras in his individualistic agnosticism,
and substitutes for individual opinion the knowledge of
divine nature.
In general, then, Plato's attitude toward the
earliest philosophers is an attitude of constructive
criticism. He has rejected some of their crudities, has
developed some of their suggestions, and has adopted
an idealistic approach to the subject which they either
neglected, or else treated only with curt dogmatism.
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III. PLATO 1 S CONCEPTION OF GOD.
A. Plato's Fundamental Definition of the Term, God.
To attempt a complete Platonic definition of God
at this point would be taking for granted two things:
that Plato had a clear definition of God, and that we
know what that definition was. Nevertheless, a
preliminary definition is necessary in order to prepare
the way for discussion.
From the lexical and etymological standpoint, it
is certain that the Greek word 0eoj is used in a more
171
fluid sense than out Anglo-Saxon word, God . More says
that "....It is equivalent loosely to the divine quality,
more specifically to the immortal, wherever it occurs."
In this sense the word may apply to all beings who are
endowed with immortality, and is not, as with us, a
name for both class and individual.
In Plato, however, the word seems to refer to the
Supreme Being of the universe, whether described as ZeCs
the Olympian, or as cteoi , the general term, or as
174
Creator and Cause. It is true that it is used with
considerable freedom, and that " the personal cause
is regarded now as the one God, and now polytheistically a
175
a company of lesser gods." It should be observed that
Plato generally distinguished between the Creator and
the lesser gods who engaged in the affairs of men, though
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176
the same geneeal term is applied to tooth. More say a that
"...the distinction is occasionally forgotten,
and particularly in the second subdivision of the
main section of the Timaeua the terms God and gods
are employed almost indiscriminately, where, by
strict propriety, only gods should be found. In
fact, the distinction between God and gods is
rather artificial than essential with Plato, and
has no great significance."
Without accepting More's declaration that Plato
failed to distinguish between G-od and gods . we may allow
that the distinction is sometimes hazy. Further discussion
will follow in Section D of this chapter. Whatever Plato
did mean by the term Be-©^ , is seems reasonably eertaln
that he used it in a particular as well as in a general
sense; that by it he referred to a real Being of spiritual
character and of universal power. His usage of the term is
limited by his uncertainty rather than by any dislike of
177
such a concept. In his Sixth Epistle he speaks of invoking
" the god who is ruler of all things present
and to come, and is rightful father of the ruling
active principle, to certain knowledge of whom, if
we genuinely practice philosophy, we shall attain as
far as it lies in the power of human beings who are
truly well endowed to do so."
Here, where he has thrown off the speech of the
philosopher, and Hrttes as man to man, he gives us a
glimpse of his personal conviction. He avows belief in
a real God, though he limits knowledge concerning Him.
Plato's belief in God transcends that of preceding
philosophers, and approaches the personalistic theism
of our modern day.

B. Reasons for Belief in God.
Plato's approach to belief in the existence of deity
178
is ethical.
"No one ever intentionally did any unholy
act, or uttered any unlawful word, retaining a
belief in the existence of the gods, but he must
have supposed one of three things: either that
they did not exist- that is the first possibility;
or secondly, that if they did they took no care of
man; or thirdly, that they were easily appeased
by sacrifices or turned from their course by prayers.
A belief in deity is therefore necessary to the
welfare of the State ; and to that end Plato proposed
179
that religion should have State support. Religion,
however, must not exist simply as a piece of State
machinery, nor as social tradition, but it mftst be put
180
on a philosophic basis. The current stories about the
gods were to be treated as folklore only. The deistic
philosophers might be wrong, but they must be proved so
on their own grounds. Legislation could not settle the
matter, since the laws must be founded on reason.
1 • The Consensus G-entlutf)
181
is the first proof adduced. Persons of all ages,
conditions, and climes have believed and worshipped
"....not as if they thought that there were no gods, but
182
as if there could be no doubt of their existence."
Plato considered this fact so self-evident as scarcely
to need emphasis.
2. The Belief of the Intelligent.
In addition to being a general belief, it was also

the belief of the mature. "...No one who had taken up in
youth this opinion, that the gods do not exist, ever
continued in the same until he was old." Increased
experience confirms rather than destroys belief in deity.
3. The Argument from Design.
This is stated in a negative fcather than in a positive
manner. The atheists are quoted as saying that the elements
"...exist by nature and by chance, and not by art
and that on this manner the whole heaven has been
created, and all that is in the heaven^ including
animals, and all plants,and that all the seasons
come from these elements, not by the action of
mind or of any god, or from art, but by
nature and by chance only." 184
This objection is drawn from the fact that everywhere
concepts of deity and of morality differ accordingly as
men Interpret nature and turn their interpretations into
authority. Nature is greater than art; hence the argument
from design is merely reading the origin of the lesser
into the phenomena of the gr^atei.
Plato did not repudiate the argument from design,
but carried it back of the objections. The difficulty lay
in the word nature . If by nature the elements were
considered the creative power, then the objection was
valid. If, however, the soul is the true creative power,
185
the argument from design still stands.
Plato's argument from design may have been a heritage
from Socrates. In the Philebus Socrates discusses it with
186
Protarchus in the following manner:
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There is a choice between the "guidance of an irrational
and random chance" as the governing power of the universe,
or a "marvellous intelligence and wisdom," The elements
which constitute all material things are not in themselves
capable of exercising the powers which we see in nature.
As Socrates says, "....There is a fire within us, and in
the universe." Just as the elements in our bodies are
formed from the elements of the universe, and not the
universe from us, so the fire in the body, which is the
soul, must be drawn from some general source, which is
the soul of the universe. There is, therefore , " . . . .in the
universe a mighty infinite and adequate limit, as well as
a cause of no mean power, which orders and arranges years
and seasons and months, and mjiy justly be called wisdom
and mind."
4. The Transcendence of Soul, or the First Cause.
All things in the universe are either at rest
or in motion. This motion may be arranged in ten different
187
categories
:
"the two mechanical motions of a body revolving upon
its axis and of a body changing its position, then the
six constituted motions which affect the parts, or
constitution o& a body, viz., combination, dissolution,
increase, diminution, generation, corruption, and
finally, two qualitative distinctions, viz., (1) the
transmitted motion of a body which moves another and is
itself moved by another, and (2) the self originating
motion of a body which moves Itself and another."
All of this motion may be described as either
transmitted motion or as self-motion. The beginning of all
motion is self-motion, since that which is transmitted must
188
ultimately be traced to some source. This self-moving
»
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power, or first cause, Plato defined as soul . Soul, then,
is" the nature which controls heaven and earth, and the
190.
whole circumference."
At this point Plato failed to generalize sufficiently.
Having grasped the fact that all motion must he traced to
a cause, he therefore attributed a sojI to each of the
191 191a
heavenly bodies, so that, as Thales said, "...all
things are full of gods." It seems strange that Plato
should not have generalized motion, and have attributed
all the several motions of the heavenly bodies to one
Great Cause. In the Tlmaeus he came nearer to this idea.
5. The Ontological Argument.
The ontological argument, as such, does not occur in
Plato's works. In Socrates' argument for the Immortality
of the soul, he contended that the soul always bears the
nature of life, just as the number five bears the nature
of oddness, and that consequently the soul can no more
192
die than the number five can be even. Caird calls this
"a close parallel to the ontological argument for the
being of God- the argument that God necessarily exists
because existence is involved in the conception of Him
193
as perfect being." It is strange that Plato did not
stumble on the argument when he approached it so closely.
#•
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C. The Problem of the Relation between G-od and the Ideas.
A cardinal point in Plato's philosophy was the belief
that truth is universal and know&ble. He had little
sympathy for the relative theory of knowledge. The
Protagorean philosophy received scant courtesy from him.
Plato wanted certainty; at least, he wanted some criterion
by which truth could be judged.
The method of learning this truth was embodied in the
Socratic dialectic. Socrates, as Plato represents him,
was constantly seeking for truth in definitions. If a
quality could be defined in such general terms as to make
it universally understandable and applicable, he sought
by skilful questioning to remove all misconceptions, and
to formulate those concepts which would serve as a key to
the understanding of the universe.
Plato went farther than his master. These concepts
became for him more than the general statement of the
truth of the universe; they became the realities themselves.
He organized these into a hierarchy of Ideas, at the head
195 196
of which was the Idea of the G-ood. These realities
existed in the ideal world, the world of mind; and the
world of matter became the copy, or shadow, of the ideal.
This teaching is best expressed in his famous Myth
197
of the Cave. Those immured in the cave, which represents
the material world, think that the shadows are the realities;
those who have penetrated to the outer world know them

to be only shadows. So Plato says:
"The prison is the world of sight, the light of
the fire is the sun, the ascent and vision of the
things above you may tryly regard as the upward
progress of the soul into the intellectual world;
that is my poor belief, to which, at your desire,
I have given expression. Whether I am right or not,
God only knows; but whether true or false my opinion
is that in the world of knowledge the idea of good
appears last of all, and is seen only with an effort;
and when seen, is also Inferred to be the universal
author of all things beautiful and. right, parent of
light and the J ord of light in this world, and the
source of truth and reason in the other; this is the
first great cause which he who would act rationally
either in public or in private must behold." 1 98
The language employed here does not necessarily
attribute personality to the Idea of the Good. If we
recognize the fact that Plato began with ideas, not with
personalities, it will be easy to understand that by such
terms as author , parent . and lord , he intends to convey a
figurative rather than a literal meaning. From this passage
alone we can draw no justification for identifying the
Idea of the Good with a personal God.
Nevertheless, in the following paragraph, there are
1
two statements which open the way for such an identification
First, the Idea of the Good subsists in the upper world.
Secondly, this Idea of the Good can be apprehended only
in a mystic sense, by a "beatific vision." Independent
existence and approach through mysticism are alBo
characteristics of God, and it is not strange that some
of the commentators on Plato tried to regard the Idea
of the Good as identical with ^od.
The commentators attack this problem with varying
•
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degrees of assurance and with widely differing views.
Moore states decidedly that the Idea of the Good "....is
200
the Absolute, the universal Reason, God." To substantiate
201
this, he quotes four passages. Of these passages, only
the first, from the Phllebus , is conclusive, and then
only in an inferential way. It is not a positive identification
of the divine nind with the Good, though evidently Plato
thinks that such an identification is not impossible.
The other passages might favor such a conclusion, but they
do not demand it.
202
Margaret Taylor is more conservative. "It is at
least safe to say that in what Plato says of God there is
nothing inconsistent with the identification of God as
the supreme Good." She adopts a noncommittal attitude,
and is content to say that there is no general agreement
203
on this subject among Platoniets.
The best defence of the identity of the Idea of the
204
Good with God is that of Adam, which is here summarized:'
The idea of the Good is the sun of the ideal world,
the luminary which enlightens the mind and makes all truth
visible. The Good is
205
1. The ultimate cause of knowledge.
206
2. The ultimate cause of Being.
3. The author of all the subordinate ideas.
From these qualities, Adam derives the identity of the
207
Good with God, since, if it is not identical, wither
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1. The idea of Good is subordinate to God; or
2. The idea of God is subordinate to Good; or
3. The two are wholly independent of one another.
The first of these is inconsistent with the sovereignty
of the Good. The second cannot be reconciled with the
conception o& the "Maker and Father of All" in the Timaeus ,
"nor, indeed, with the suggestion in the Re public that God
208
is the author of the secondary or derivative Ideas."
Of these suggestions, the first is valid. It is out
of keeping with Platonic thought to subordinate the Good
to anything else. The third inference is also logical,
The second, however, is not so clear. The creative office
of God as represented in the Timaeus does not necessarily
make him sovereign of the Idea of the Good; in fact, he
is represented as eeercising that creative power in
209
,
subordination to a pattern. Adam s argument is weak
at this point.
In fairness to him, his positive reasons for his
210
contention should be cited. They are mainly argument
from analogy between the position of the Good in the
Re public and the Creator in the Timaeus .
211
1. Both are "The Best."
212
2. Both are hard to discover.
2J3
3. Both are the Source of the Universe.
214
4. Both are the Sole Cause.
215
5. Both are Author of Ideas.
•
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Adam admits that In the Re public the idea of Good
216
"...is something purely impersonal and abstract."
217
In other dialogues he connects personality with
Absolute Goodness and Being.
218
Professor Burnet takes the opposite view:
"If by God we mean the conception of the
modern theists, the idea of the Good must be
included. If by God we mean Plato's concept,
no. The Good is not a soul, but a form."
219
Then he adds this significant comment:
"The Good, according to Plato, is not a soul,
but is independent of God, and even above him,
since it is the pattern by which he fashions the
world."
This means that the old dilemma," Is the conception
of Justice and holiness prior in our minds to the
conception of Gtod, or is our conception of God prior to
the conception of justice and holiness," is again
220
raised. Plato "sets the ultimate source of good and evil
outside of the divine nature, evil being belcw God, and
good in a way, as that which he imitates in the act of
221
creation, above God."
Any attempt at identification of the two must be
222
inferential rather than direct. Adam has shown a
remarkable parallelism between Plato's description of the
cosmological God of the Tlmaeus and of the Idea in the
Republic . The analogy proves only tha.t he has progressed
toward theism along two separate paths, but had not
reached the place where they met. That he was puzzled
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over this difficulty seems plain from the mysticism with.
223
which he shrouds tfach of these truths. In the Tlmaeus
he admits his inability to deal adequately with the
concept. We may say, then, that Plato developed two
parallel ideas, one of a Creator, who is good, and one of
a Supreme Good, which is creative, each of wuich was
expressive of his belief in a Supreme Organizing Power
in the universe and distinct from it, which ideas he
failed to identify as one God.
D. The Attributes of God.
1. Unity: Polytheism, Henotheism, and Monotheism.
In the growth of Platonic thought from the earlier
Socratic Dialogues to the Tlmaeus and the Laws, there is
224
a marked tendency away from polytheism. In the Euthybhro
we have Socrates 1 criticism of the immorality of the gods.
He evidently was willing to retain a belief in their
existence, provided that the legends were expurgated in
conformity with moral law.
With the desire for purification of religion came
also a tendency to seek one supreme God. In the grotesque
etymological discourse of Socrates, as recorded in the
Cratvlus . promimenee is given to Zeus above all the
other gods.
"For there is none who is more the author of
life to us and to all than the lord and king of all.
Wherefore we ought to call him Zeus and Dia, which are
one name, although divided, meaning the God in
whom all creatures have life."
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From this, which is indicative rather than conclusive
in its character, it may be reasoned that Socrates was a
monotheist by inclination, though perhaps not by conviction
of profession. The many references to God in the Apology
are Inconclusive, since the terra may there be only a
general name for whatever divine person the spokesman
had in mind.
The teaching of the Timaeus indicates that Plato finally
arrived at the conception of one supreme G-od, the
226
Creator, through the necessity of finding a First Cause.
This Creator is responsible for the ordered universe,
227
wnich he framed out of chaos according to the pattern
228
of eternal good. Insofar as present relationships of men
and the universe are concerned, he is supreme.
A second place was given to the universe itself.
Plato conceived o£ it as "a living soul, and truly
,,229
rational through the providence of G-od. It was the
"fairest and most perfect of intelligible beings, framed
one visible animal comprehending within all other animals
^ 230
of a kindred nature." The universe was animate and self-
sufficient; divine in nature, and a copy of the Creator.
It is "....the copy of the sensible G-od who is the image
of the intelligible, greatest, best, fairest, and most
231
perfect,- the one only-begotten universe."
This peculiar relationship between the CreatOB and
the universe, by which the latter is a kind of deity, is
evidently Plato's attempt to solve the problem of the
immanence and transcendence of Gfod. He rejected Deism,
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yet evidently felt that pantheism was inadequate. He
carefully distinguished between the Creator and the
233
"god that was to be."
Furthermore, he relegates the traditional Olympian
deities to an altogether secondary place as creations
of the one Creator. Perhaps there is a touch of irony in
his words when he says:
"To tell of other divinities, and to know
their origin, is beycftd us, and we must accept
the traditions of the men of old time who affirm
themselves to be the offspring of gods, and
they must surely have known the truth about
their own ancestors." 234
235
Some of these he identifies with the planets. All of
them are works of the Creator of the Universe, who has
made them immortal and indissoluble according to his
236
pleasure
.
From a cosmological standpoint, these deities are
secondary to the one Creator; from a religious standpoint,
they are considered as objects of worship. Strangely
enough, Plato said nothing about worshiping the Creator.
237
In the Laws he stipulated that the good man shall
regularly have lntereourse with the gods through prayer,
offering ,and divine service. He established a descending
settle of worship: The Olympians, the gods of the state,
the cliltihonian deities, the daemons, the heroes, the
238
paternal gods, and, finally, living parents. There are
slight indications that these provisions are a concession
to popular thought. There is an abrupt transition from
the ethical measurement by God to the service of the
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gods, as though that were as far as the average man could
239
reach in his thought. More says that "...he accepted
the traditional gods, as manifestations more of less
symbolic of the obscure daemonic powers working through the
240
phenomena of the world Indeed, the distinction
between G-od and the secondary gods should not be taken
too literally."
Since Plato considers the gods of popular belief as
the creations of the Creator, his doctrine cannot properly
be called henotheism. The Creator is not, like Zeus,
primus inter pares . but is the cause and ground of their
existence. They are derived deities; and bear about the
same relation to the Creator that the saints do to G-od
in current Roman Catholic thought- they make deity
accessible
.
241
For this reason, Burnet calls Plato a monotheist,
and with some qualification, I agree with Burnet. There
is one bit of evidence in the Epistles which seems
conclusive. "At the beginning of the letters that are
seriously intended," says the philosopher, "I put G-od ;
242
in other cases, the gods . " Plato was probably a
philosophical monotheist, though, in his Laws , he gave
support to State religion as a means for preserving
virtjje and tranquillity.
The necessary qualification is that this monotheism
was not perfect. On the one hand, the theology of the
•
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Timaeus makes G-od almost as unapproachable as the gods
of those Whom Plato criticized so roundly for believing that
243
they did not care for men. On the other hand, it does
little to relieve the confusion which the popular polytheism
fostered. Had Plato b^en as ardent in theological reform
as he was in political reform, he might have pressed
his thought farther and been more definite in his
conclusions. As Taylor says, "The position of G-od in the
philosophy of both fsocrates and Plato} seems
244
ambiguous, and not fully thought out."
2. Personality*
Granting that the G-od whom Plato described is
separate from the universe, and not to be identified
either with the World Soul or with any one of the Olympian
deities, our next quest is to discover if this G-od is
personal. Was the term God simply Plato's method of
describing the Unknown Ultimate, or did he refer to
impersonal primal force?
By personal we mean the possession of "the two
essential constituents of .... .self-consciousness and
245
self-determination ." Personality was not unknown to
G-reek thought as a concept, though it did not enter
246
into the discussions of pre-Platonic philosophy.
Nor was it customary for the Greeks to think of deity
as impersonal force; on the contrary, they erred in the
direction of anthropomorphism. Neither from a
psychological nor from a theological standpoint would
a personal G-od have been Impossible to the Greek mind.

This G-od of Plato must be either personal or impersonal*
247
If impersonal
,
deity may be treated in one of two ways:
(ij either as a Platonic idea, or (2) as impersonal force.
There would be no other possibility that could be
drawn from the evidence of the Dialogues .
The first of these possibilities is refuted by the
distinction which I have described as existing between
the G-od of the Timaeus and the Idea of the G-ood. Had
there been no distinction, Adam would not have been at
such pains to draw the analogy which is quoted on page 60.
Obvious facts do not require strained proof to make them
clear.
Again, in accounting for the source and end of
individual personal life, a personal Creator is necessary.
248
The argunefot of the Phllebus follows tuis course.
Socrates insists that Inasmuch as we have a soul, the
universe must also have a soul behind it. That this is
different from the World-Soul, or animate universe of the
Timaeus seems certain because of the distinction drawn
between the universe and its cause. The "mind"of the
Philebus accords with the Creator of the Timaeus . The
249
Timaeus teaches that mortal souls are the creation of
intermediary deities; but this does not invalidate the
conclusion that personal beings must ultimately spring
from a personal source.
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Plato carries his highest reality back to mind.
Even though the Idea of the Good he not personal in
itself, an Idea is unintelligible unless it be conceived
in relation to a mind. The Creator of the Tlmaeus is
represented as fashioning the world in accordance with
250
"that which is apprehended by reason and mind." Calrd
says that "the supreme principle is a conscious and
active principle, whose activity manifests itself in every
251
element and part of the universe." Fisher says: "He
teaches that God is a Person, a self-conscious intelligence,
No other interpretation o£ this doctrine is so reconcilable
252
with his various utterances on the subject."
One difficulty stands id the way of recognizing
the God of Plato as personal. If he is personal, why is
there not more emphasis on his personality? The answer
is that Plato Aid not attempt constructive thought on
this subject until late in life, and so did not perfect
his theology as he did his dialectic. The concept of a
personal God, as he approached it, lay beyond his system
of ideas. Apparently death stopped the work. Certain it is
that his philosophy developed toward the concept rather
than away from it, thougn the personality of God described
in Plato seems abstruse and wooden to us.
3. Character.
Not only is this deity distinct from the gods of
popular belief in being, but also in character.

a. Goodness.
Absolute goodness Is the cardinal characteristic of
Deity. He is "holy and Just and wise...... In God is no
unrighteousness at all, he is altogether righteous."
In this respect he is different from the Olympian gods,
whose moral character was not always above reproach.
This absolute moral goodness precludes attributing
254
evil to God. He is Hihe "best of causes," and the world
is the fairest of creations." the cosmological aspect is
not emphasized so much as the ethical, however. God is
not the cause of adversity and suffering. Plato
criticizes Homer and Aeschylus severely for making deity
responsible for good and evil alike. "The good only is
to be attributed to him; of the evil, other causes have
255
to be discovered." Especially is this true of punishment.
If God inflicts punishment on men, it is remedial rather
than vindictive. If the wicked are miserable, it is not
because God has made them miserable by punishment, but,
because the condition which calls for punishment is itself
misery. "That God being good is the author of evil to
anyone, that is to oe strenuously denied Such a
256
fiction is suicidal, impious."
In the myth of Creation in the Timaeus this same idea
is reiterated, with the implication that evil is the prAduct
of a false exercise of free-will. "All these laws God
established and pronounced to the souls, to the end that
he might be guiltless of the evil hereafter incurred by
258
any of them." This implication is strengthened by the
•
statement in the myth of Er that "Virtue is free, and as
a man honors or dishonors her, he will hctve more or less
259
of her; the chooser is answerable,- God is justified."
Whatever may be the origin of evil, G-od is not responsible
for it.
b« Immutability.
A second characteristic of deity is immutability.
Since that which is nearest perfection is least subject £c
change, and since God is perfect, He is not subject to
change. Furthermore, if he were to change at all, it
must be for the worse, since he could not change for the
better. But since he could not be good, and still change
260
for the worse, G-od is unchangeable.
This immutability applies both to character and to
form. Neither in inward ch^ractefc nor in outward
representation can God change. He does not assume Protean
261
forms in Order to appear to us, nor does he employ
deception. His character forbids such devices, neither has
he motives for it. "God is perfectly simple and true both
in deed and word; he changes not; he deceives not, either
262
by dream or waking vision, by sign or by word."
c. Rationality.
This deity is not simply the personification of
goodness and immutability, but is a rational being.
"God. .. .moves according to his nature in a straight line
263
towards the accomplishment of his end." The teleology
•
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implied here is ethical rather than cosmic in its
content. The whole passage places the emphasis upon the
pctrpose and character of God as the standard with which
men must conform. A purpose implies rationality; and if
the God of Plato is purposeful, he must also be rational.
d. Limitation.
Whether or not Plato considered his God as limited
is debatable. Twice he remarks that "not even God can
264
fight against necessity." Since this is quoted as a
current proverb it may not represent Plato's own thought,
though Bin the second of these instances he seemd to feel
that mathematical necessity is beyond the control of
Deity.
That Deity is somewhat limited by Necessity seems
probable, because in the Tlmaeus mind and necessity are
265
given as the causes of creation. The operation of Deity
266
is qualified by such phrases as "as far as possible,"
It
which shows that .was working against a contrary force.
Yet Deity is not wholly under the control of
Necessity. "Mind, the ruling power, persuaded necessity
to bring the greater part of created things to perfection,
and thus, in the beginning, when the influence of reason
267
got the better of necessity, the universe was created."
There is a struggle between Deity and necessity, in
268
which Deity is mainly, though not wholly, successful.
%
This dualism, as we have already observed in another
connection, is the great weakness in Plato s theistic
thought. It was probably the result of his struggle with
the problem of evil, and if he failed, his failure is
pardonable. Though he did not overcome this difficulty,
he defined it more clearly, and carried it nearer to
solution by the presentation of a deity characterized
by goodness, immutability, and rationality, even though
limited.
E. Religious and Philosophical Importance.
Prom this conception of God arise certain corollaries.
1. Religious Implications.
a. Belief in Divine Providence.
Plato contends that since Deity is perfectly good,
269
he cannot be shiftless, indolent, and careless. He is
firmly convinced that God is interested in all of his
creation, in spite of the fact t&at he seems so far
away. More cites three objections to Providence that
Plato answers.
(1) Why did not the Creator contrive his
handiwork so that it would operate without
the necessity of his intervention? 270
The answer is that "creation is the approximate
and continuous subjection to law and order of a
subsisting chaos which never succumbs perfectly to
restraint, and never yields up its own spasmodic impulse."
How impersonal chaos could have a "spasmodic impulse" is
•
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not made clear. Probably More means that the resistance to
the will ofl G-od by chaos is evil only in a relative sense.
It might be termed evil, though not sin.
(2) How can we conceive of G-od as caring for
small things? 271
Plato pictures G-od as a workman with a mind for
infinite detail. If he neglects any item in the universe,
it must be either from indolence or from ignorance.
Since Deity is susceptible of neither, he must be
272
interested in the small details of life. So he says:
"Let us not, then, deem God inferior to
human workmen, who, in proportion to their skill,
finish and perfect their works, small as well as
great, by one and the same art; or that God, the
wisest of beings, who is willing and able to extend
his care to all things, like a lazy and good-for-
nothing wants a holiday, and takes no thought of
smaller and easier matters, but of the greater only."
(3) The old dilemma of a good God and the
existence of evil: Why do the wicked prosper? 273
Plato explains this difficulty by the use of metem$>
274
psychosis. Each individual has the power of becoming
what he pleases, and according to what he chooses, his
destiny is fixed. The evils that men endure are the
result of their own choice. Yet here there is a flaw in
Platonism. "...This lays great emphasis on human
responsibility, but gives no indication of divine mercy.
275
As a religion, Platonism fails at this point."
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b. Belief in Recognition of God in the State.
This connection between religion and life was carried
over into the concept of the State. In the Laws Clelnias
276
says
:
"It is a matter of no small consequence that
our reasons in proof of the assertion that there
are gods, and that they are good, and regard Justice
more than men, should carry some sort of conviction
with them. This would be the best and noblest
preamble of all our laws."
Plato is certain that law must have a religious basis.
Conversely, his proposal to incorporate religious
observances into State law argues for his belief in G-od.
Not onlf is religion the foundation of law, but
277
law is the defense of religion. Plato proposes a law
which shall provide penalties for impiety. Two classes
of persons are recognized: "he who does not believe
in the gods and yet has a righteous nature," and "they
who, besides believing that the world is devoid of gods,
278
are intemperate." Imprisonment for" five years, with
death on second offence is prescribed for the first;
life imprisonment and dishonorable death for the second.
Private religion is forbidden.
Such regulations seem unduly severe, especially in
the light of Plato's own exercise of free thought. Yet
they may be the result of his moral earnestness and of
his intense desire to form ideal worship in an ideal state.
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c. Belief in Private Religion.
The legislation against private religion in the
Laws applies to outward worship, not to inward piety.
It was a measure directed against abuses of worship,
not as a means to abolish private devotion. Plato's
belief in God produced an intense personal ethical
280
effect, which is realized in private worship.
Its first doctrine is that "...the highest good
281
for man is likeness too God." Evil is inherent in this
mortal sphere; but if we can separate ourselves from it,
and attain to likeness to God, we shall reach the
heights of virtue. Men ought to seek virtue, which is the
likeness of God, not out of fear of earthly punishments,
but out of fear of the greatest punishment of all, which
is the gradual an& lasting conformity to the likeness
of evil.
Secondly, the achievement of likeness to God is
developed through worship. "For the good man to offer
sacrifice to the gods, and hold converse with them by
means of prayers and offerings and every kind of
service is the noblest and best of all things, and
also the most conducive to a happy life, and very fit
282
and meet."
283
Prayer, which plays so important a part in worship,
is given a place both in public and in private life. The
284
personal prayer of Socrates is essentially a petition
for moral qualities rather than for material gifts.
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Voiced as it is to Pan, a particular deity, it reveals the
pesults of belief in a personal deity.
Thirdly, worship must be practical. It included
reverence for parents, who, better than idols, were
images of God, and it included also obedience to the
285
laws of the State. Deity is best served by a right kind
of humanitarlanism, which brings a reward of its own here,
and a greater reward hereafter.
God is the end of all life and the goal of human
aspiration. He is the center of Platonic thinking: "G-od
286
is the measure of all things." If Plato assigns man
287
an inferior and apparently unworthy position, it is
only in contrast to the exaltation of deity.
288
The attainment of this end is "by taking thought."
The asceticism of Plato is the asceticism of devotion
rather than of self-moatification. The point of this
mysticism was missed by the Neo-Platonists , who developed
Plato's mystical tendencies without developing his
definitions of thought and practicality in equal proportion.
2. Philosophical Implications,
a. Revelation in Nature.
Plato's theism marked several advance stepto in
289
philosophy. First of all, as Adam has indicated, "if
the Good is the sole cause of Being, it will follow
that the whole of Nature, so far as It really exists,
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is a revelation of God." The universe is "the sensible
God who is the image of the intelligible, greatest, best,
290
fairest, and most perfect- the one only-begotten universe,"
291
"the god that was to be...." If we would know what is the
nature of the real God, we may read the copy, blurred,
to be sure, in the universe around us.
b. Ultimate Reality of Good.
Secondly, Plato's theism argues for the ultimate
reality of good. Though evils may abound among men, evil
is not the preponderant element in the Universe. At the
head of all things is the Idea of the Good; the rulership
of all things is vested in a God who is good.
c. Beginning of Personalisnw
Thirdly, it opens the way to personalism. None off
Plato* s predecessors had attempted seriously to identify
the Ultimate Being of philosophy with a personal God.
It might be claiming too much to say that Plato made such
an identification; it is not too much to say that he
directed thought in that direction. Moreover, by
presenting good and evil as personal characteristics
as well as abstract principles, he prepared the way for
a personalistlc system of ethics.
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3. Influence on Subsequent Philosophies.
Plato's greatest Influence was upon the philosophy
of Neo-Platonism, which exaggerated two of his concepts:
dualism, and mysticism. G-od and the world are as far
apart as good and evil. God is wholly unknowable and
undtfinable; and can be experienced only as we rise above
sensibility and intellect into pure spiritual contact
292
with him.
Both dualism and mysticism appear in Plato, but they
constitute weaknesses or gaps in his thinking rather
than fundamental tenets; and probably would have been
eliminated to a large degree had he carried his thought
further. Certainly it seems true that Plato himself
would not have developed what later appeared as Neo-
Platonism.
i
Plato s influence was not limited to the schools of
the pagan thinkers. The struggle between Christianity
and paganism produced two results: the obliteration of
the pagan schools of thought, and the gradual absorption
of the best of the pagan ideas into the scheme of
Christian thought. Certain men, such as Origen and
Augustine, gave their attention to this problem, with
the result that Cnrlstianlty came to be expressed in
philosophical terms, and that philosophy became the
293
adjunct of Christianity.
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From the standpoint of theism, Augustine is the most
important of these men, Justin Martyr, and others prior
to and contemporary with Augustine engaged in the task of
reconciling Christianity and philosophy, but Augustine was
the greatest of these, and the most influential. It is
doubtful is there has been any other single thinker in
Christendom apart from St. Paul who has done more to
influence Christian theology and philosophy. He "marks
the transition between the constructive period of Christian
thought, and the long period of the Middle Ages, when
dogma had become fixed, and no freedom was allowed the
mind outside the narrow limits of an ecclesiastical
294
system,"
The source of Augustifae's Platonlsm was a Latin
version of the Dialogues
.
"translated by the famous
295
rhetorician Victorinus Afer." At the time when these
works were presented to him, Augustine was struggling with
the dualism of Manichaelsm. The contradictions of this
teaching and the notorious immorality of its adherents
disgusted him; yet he eould not quite break from it.
The idealistic philosophy of Platonism, its logical develop-
ment, and its "exposition of pure intellectual being
296
and of the origin of evil" attracted his attention.
His contact with Plato was not entirely direct; he
297
read both Plotinus and Plato, and abandoned Manichaeism
forever, Platonism became the bridge between Manichaeism
t
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and Christianity. "But having then read those books of
the Platonlsts," he says, "and being admonished by them
to search for incorporeal trtith, I saw Thy invisible
298
things, understood by those things that are made."
How much of his theism was distinctly Christian
and how much was Neo-Platonlc is a question. Through
the Platonic philosophy, monism replaced dualism in
his thinking, and -the intellectual world of ideas
superseded the materialism of Manichaeism. "He learnt
to recognize the invisible God; he attained the knowledge
that this God is, and is eternal, always the same,
subject to change neither in his parts nor in his
299 300
motions." In his Confessions he compared the doctrine
of the Platonlsts with the Aoj-cs of the Fourth Gospel;
and states that the study of Platonism ftftd him to an
appreciation of the truth of Christianity. He says in
301
the City of God : "It is evident that none come nearer
to us than the Platonlsts."
Yet he did not borrow from Plato without
discrimination. He was influenced by Neo-Platonism
insofar as Neo-Platonism coincided with Christianity;
but he rejected several of Plato's theories, such as that
302
of the animate world. Plato himself he honored above
the deities of paganism, and said that he was more
303
worthy of worship than any of them; yet he was not
it
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unqualifiedly a Platonist; and if we may judge by his
Confessions and by his City of God he came finally to
rely more on Scripture for his doctrines of God than
he did on Plato.
In the Middle Ages, through the mysticism of Neo-
Platonism, which was embodied in the works of Pseudo-
Dionysius, and its Interpreter, Erigena, Platonism
304
was revived. Erigena, who was the first eminent
philosopher of the Middle ages, drew his Platonism
from at least two sources: from the works of Pseudo-
305
Dionysius, an unknown Christian mystic of the fifth
century, and from the Timaeus of Plato, either from the
translation of Chalcidius, or from that of Cicero. His
chief tenet regarding God was an adaptation of the
teaching in the Timaeus that the world is God developed
306
into the particular. Erigena s Platonism, however,
307
approached pantheism so closely that it is doubtful
if Plato would have recognized his own philosophy, had he
been living in Erigena f s time.
These philosophies are directly and professedly
traceable to Plato. Indirectly, his influence may
have been even greater, Aristotle, his great pupil,
dispensed with the gods of mythology whom Plato had
relegated to a secondary place, and considered God
308
as absolute Thought, a self-contained, self-causing,
self-completing Absolute.
#
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION.
From the foregoing study of Plato as a thelst,
I conclude:
1. That the times in which Plato lived,
because of the general unrest and because of the
cosmopolitan contacts, were conducive to the
growth of religious speculation; and that Plato
shared in the tendency of his times.
2. That because of his wide travels and
acquaintance with men and thought, he was as
adequately prepared as anyone of his time to
deal with the subject of theism.
3. That while he accepted contributions from
the Olympian and Mystery religions, and from the
philosophers, he was not fully satisfied with any one
of them, and attempted the construction of an
original system.
4. That he firmly believed in the existence of
one Ultimate Deity, who was the Designer and
Creator of the Universe, and upon whom all "gods"
depended for their existence.
5. That his belief in this Deity was founded
on arguments from universal intuition, the
belief of the intelligent, the necessity of
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a First Cause, and possibly from the ontological
argument*
6. That, while it is not Justifiable to assert
positively that Plato considered G-od and the Idea
of the Good as identical, there is a parallelism
between the two which tends toward such an
identification.
7. That Plato could not properly be called a
polythelst or a henotheiet, and that he could be
called an incomplete raonotheist.
8. That he probably tended to belief in a personal
Deity, though he did not stress personalism.
Certainly, Plato's G-od could not be called impersonal.
9. That this Deity is characterized by goodness,
immutability, and rationality.
10. That He is limited to some extent oy Necessity,
which shows that Plato was a metaphysical dualist.
H. That this theism had a decided ethical import,
and a personal application in the religious life of
the State and of the individual.
12. That this belief in theism made Nature a
revelation of G-od, regarded the ultimate reality
as good, and opened the way for personalism.
•
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